SNA (Tokyo) — From 1937-1939, the nation was led by rightwing aristocrat Fumimaro Konoe, regarded by many as a man of destiny who might lead the nation to a glorious future. Konoe, however, proved to be a rudderless leader and soon allowed himself to be dragged into an all-out confrontation with nationalist forces in China.

Transcript

On June 4, 1937, Fumimaro Konoe became prime minister of Japan.

Many expected that his premiership would be something special. He was a high-level aristocrat, and even though quite young at age 45, he was politically experienced and possessed a wide range of contacts.

Even the military appreciated Konoe’s ascension due to his rightwing ideological leanings, and articles which he had published criticizing Anglo-American imperialism.

Upon coming to office, Konoe wanted to mark a new era by advocating a general pardon for leftists arrested under the Peace Preservation Law as well as for militarists involved in previous coup attempts. This would symbolize the unity of the nation. However, his amnesty proposal was blocked by skeptics, including the last of the Genro, Kinmochi Saionji.

Konoe faced his defining crisis just a month after becoming premier. Fighting unexpectedly broke out at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing between units of the Imperial Army and China’s nationalist forces.

Some military staff officers, such as Kanji Ishiwara, saw the fighting as an unwelcome distraction. In their view, the focus needed to be kept on strengthening the Japanese economy and building up military strength to face the Soviet Union.

However, the Imperial Army officers in the field advised Konoe to teach the Chinese a lesson. They explained to the prime minister that it wouldn’t be difficult to defeat the Chinese nationalist army.

Konoe was persuaded by the field officers’ view, and he authorized large-scale offensive military actions. Within a month, Japanese troops marched victoriously into Beijing.

But Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek did not react in the way which the Imperial Army had predicted. Both he and the Chinese forces he led were now ready for a fight.

They shocked the Japanese military by going on the offensive further south in Shanghai, fighting hard in a bloody battle that lasted for three months, in which tens of thousands of Japanese soldiers were killed.

Konoe, who believed that he had authorized a limited punitive military action against a far inferior enemy, instead found himself stuck in a bloody quagmire with no end clearly in sight.

He did receive some domestic political benefits, however. A patriotic wave swept across Japan, and Konoe remained an admired figure. The few dissenters could easily be swept aside.

But Konoe himself was not a decisive man. He had no specific policy program to advance. He was usually content to remain passive, coordinating between initiatives proposed by others, rather than push any agenda of his own.

By late November 1937, the Imperial Army had finally won the battle of Shanghai, though at great cost. But they were then shocked to discover that, despite having killed nearly 200,000 nationalist troops, the Chinese were still fighting and showing no sign that they intended to surrender.

They therefore decided to advance on Chiang Kai-Shek’s capital city of Nanjing.

Japan’s military performed better at this juncture, losing several thousand troops as it seized Nanjing in early December. However, as they flooded into the city the Imperial Army engaged in an orgy of looting, rape, and murder of the civilian population. News of this event soon hit headlines across the world, soiling Japan’s national reputation and hardening Western attitudes towards the East Asian Great Power.

In spite its battle defeats and the Nanjing atrocities, the Chinese nationalists still did not surrender. Konoe responded by announcing in January 1938 that Japan no longer recognized Chiang Kai-Shek as China’s leader and would deal only with some new Chinese government.

In the spring, the Konoe government pushed the State General Mobilization Law and other legislation through the House of Representatives which put the entire nation on a war footing. This included options for the nationalization of strategic industries including the news media, control over civil organizations such as labor unions, the drafting of civilian workers, price controls and rationing, and much more.

These moves toward a centrally planned economy and state-directed propaganda campaigns were transforming the national structure. It represented the final nail in the coffin for democratic political party rule.

Japan was now fully at war, but military setbacks continued. The Imperial Army initiated a border crash with the Soviet Union near Lake Khasan, only to have its forces thrown back with hundreds of soldiers killed. Both sides soon decided to back away from an immediate escalation.

On the other hand, the Konoe government was also tightening its links with Nazi Germany, including the hosting of a friendship visit by a Hitler Youth delegation in the late summer.

Konoe announced in November 1938 that there would be what he called a “New Order” in East Asia, though he remained vague about exactly what this new order would entail.

While there was no rival on the political scene who could threaten Konoe’s position as the year 1938 came to a close, the man himself was indecisive about what to do next and was feeling insecure. Many bold schemes were being proposed to him, but he declined to commit himself to any of them.

It thus came as a total shock to the public when, on January 5, 1939, Fumimaro Konoe resigned as prime minister in the midst of what most Japanese believed was the prosecution of a successful war in China. Konoe himself understood that it had developed into a military quagmire, and he didn’t want to take responsibility for the next steps.

He had served for one year and 216 days.

Fumimaro Konoe will return.

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