SNA (Seattle) — Throughout its nearly eight years in power, the Abe administration pressed forward with all its might to build a new US airbase at Henoko, Okinawa.

The Henoko plan originated in a 1996 Tokyo-Washington agreement to close Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa. The United States has over thirty bases there, so Okinawans initially rejoiced at the news—until they learned that first, a “Futenma Replacement Facility” would be built 36 kilometers away at Henoko.

For environmental and other reasons, Okinawans have battled the central government ever since, at the polls, in the courts, and with direct action. Now, Japan has a new prime minister, Yoshihide Suga. While any change in government makes a new approach possible, Suga’s long record on Okinawa policy suggests that, as far as Henoko is concerned, hope for change would best be sought elsewhere.

Under Abe, Suga served as chief cabinet secretary, a position with multiple roles, including administration spokesman, inter-ministry coordinator, and the prime minister’s right-hand man (only one woman has ever held the post, and even then, briefly).

While Abe was the ultimate decision-maker, Suga exerted a profound influence on Okinawa policy, from advising Abe to giving the government’s spin at press conferences. And when multiple ministries got involved, as in 2018 when the Defense Ministry asked the land minister to overturn Okinawa’s revocation of approval for landfill work (a preliminary stage in base construction), Suga almost certainly coordinated between them.

Also responsible for mediating between the prime minister and his party, it was likely Suga who arranged for Liberal Democratic Party Diet members to campaign for pro-base candidates in Okinawa elections and, some allege, helped strategize their campaigns.

Suga’s influence only increased in 2014 when he obtained an additional post: “minister in charge of mitigating the impact of US forces in Okinawa.” Rarely was a job title more out of keeping with reality, for the administration defined “mitigating the impact” primarily as transferring a base from one location in Okinawa to another, on the pretext that Henoko’s more remote location in Nago city would eliminate the danger of Futenma, smack dab in the middle of Ginowan city. That Okinawans disputed that this would genuinely and significantly mitigate the impact was of no concern to Suga.

Also in his role of “mitigating the impact,” Suga travelled to Okinawa in December 2015 to celebrate the US return of about half of its Northern Training Area. The celebrants were silent about the quid pro quo for this return of land the Pentagon no longer needed: six new US Marine helipads. When construction began, Tokyo sent hundreds of riot police to quell protests. But for Suga, the return was a public relations coup, persuading many mainlanders that the government had done Okinawans a huge favor.

A guiding principle of the Abe administration’s approach to Okinawa, as implemented by Suga, was that of the carrot and stick—or in the more evocative Japanese expression, “candy and the whip.” One manifestation of this was the weaponization of a program for promoting Okinawa’s fragile economy. After Takeshi Onaga was elected governor in 2014 on the promise to stop Henoko base construction, the program’s budget was steadily cut, and in 2016, Suga explicitly linked the budget to the prefecture’s cooperation with the base policy. For electing Onaga, the people of Okinawa were punished.

As administration spokesman, Suga also weaponized language, endlessly insisting that transferring Futenma to Henoko is “the only solution” to address Futenma’s danger. Suga has been making this claim since 2013, delivering a message that the matter is closed and beyond all debate. In fact, a paramount reason for this “solution” is that transferring Futenma to a mainland site would provoke more intense political blowback against the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.

When an anti-base mayor of Nago city won reelection in 2014, Suga declared, “The mayor’s authority is limited. The central government will proceed with the work in a straightforward manner while explaining the project in detail and seeking to gain the understanding of local residents.”

“Seeking understanding” was another of his rhetorical flourishes, and in that very statement he showed its true meaning: dismissing Okinawa’s democratically expressed popular will. The reverse side of this coin was exaggerating the significance of elections that went Suga’s way: when anti-base candidates won, it was supposedly about the economy, but when pro-base candidates won—after hiding their position from voters—it was a ringing endorsement of the Henoko plan.

Suga’s contempt for Okinawa was on full display when he attended a memorial for the late Governor Onaga in 2018. The assembled mourners were well aware of Suga’s relentless drive to undermine Onaga, and this occasion was no exception. He told them, “We are determined to steadily produce results so as to cut Okinawa’s burden with regards to the US base issue.” Shouts rang out of “Liar!,” “Shameless!,” and “Don’t ever come here again!”

Suga was the central figure in Abe administration efforts to force the Henoko base on Okinawa.

Suga’s words and deeds while serving another government, of course, do not necessarily foretell his actions as head of his own. And though he made a general promise to continue Abe’s policies, different priorities may emerge over time. Thus, we must also consider what he’s said and done since entering the race for Liberal Democratic Party president, winning it, and taking office as prime minister.

When asked about the Henoko plan at the September 2 press conference where he announced his candidacy, he replied that it was decided by the 1996 US-Japan agreement—one in which Okinawa had no input.

On September 13, Suga repeated an old claim of his—that relocating Futenma to Henoko will lead to the transfer of 9,000 US personnel out of Okinawa. This was false; in 2012 (while the Democratic Party of Japan was in power), Tokyo and Washington de-linked that transfer from progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility.

Suga’s cabinet appointments provided further clues. Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi is the brother of Shinzo Abe, with whom he shares many hawkish views. In 2012, while serving as chair of the House of Councillors Special Committee on Okinawa and Northern Problems, Kishi favored the Futenma relocation.

Taro Kono holds several posts in the new administration, including minister in charge of Okinawa and Northern Territories affairs. As Abe’s foreign and later defense minister, Kono called Henoko “the only solution” and asked current Okinawa Governor Denny Tamaki for his “understanding.”

Intriguingly, though, when Tamaki was still in the House of Representatives, he and Kono met weekly for breakfast.

Finally, Suga passed down to Katsunobu Kato all of his former posts, including chief cabinet secretary and “mitigating the impact” minister. While Kato served in previous cabinets—most recently, as health minister—he lacks a deep record on security in general or US bases in particular.

Suga took office as prime minister on September 16, and the very next day, Kishi became the first member of the cabinet to invoke Suga’s “the only solution” line, adding that, in instructing him, the prime minister had “conscientiously explained his way of thinking in terms of removing the risks of Futenma Air Station and relocating it to Henoko, explained the government’s efforts in implementing a visible reduction of the military base burden on Okinawa, and expressed that he wants to strive to gain local understanding.”

In short, absolutely nothing would change: the Suga government intends to continue running roughshod over the wishes of Okinawans while play-acting that it seeks their understanding.

The central government, however, is not the complete master of events. In fact, after causing an uproar by retaliating against scholars critical of government security policy, Suga may already be vulnerable. Most importantly, what happens now also depends upon other players.

Within the ruling party, Kono, who might run in the Liberal Democratic Party presidential election next September, is a wild card.

As Tim Shorrock reports, he once made off-the-record comments on Futenma at odds with Japan’s official position. If any further setbacks to Henoko construction emerge, this “maverick” could be the one to tell his party that it’s time to face reality.

Another important player is the political opposition. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), fainthearted perhaps from memories of how the administration of Yukio Hatoyama was cut short after seeking alternatives to Henoko in 2010, has been ineffectual as a supporter of Okinawa. But with an infusion of members from the Democratic Party for the People (DPFP), the numerically stronger CDPJ may be bolder. One of those new members is CDPJ policy chief Kenta Izumi, who said, “It’s doubtful whether Henoko fulfills a vitally important role to America,” suggesting that negotiations with the United States are needed.

Another emigre from the DPFP is Tomohiro Yara, who represents a district in Okinawa and helped form a Japanese version of the US Congressional Progressive Caucus. That’s significant on its own, but the “Japan Progressive Caucus” is in contact with its US counterpart, with which it aims to collaborate on various issues, including the Henoko base. This could give US progressives like Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez a perspective they’ve hitherto lacked.

In the United States, much is riding on the presidential election. If Democrats are freed of having all of their attention occupied by Donald Trump, turning a critical eye on Henoko becomes possible.

Given the years it will take to reinforce the mayonnaise-soft sea floor under the Henoko construction site, change could also come from a Pentagon losing patience as the base’s completion date keeps receding into the future. An evolution in Marine Corps strategy away from fixed bases could also prompt a reconsideration of the need for Futenma and Henoko.

By pressing such points, congressional progressives could gain allies among centrists and even conservatives. In fact, before it was stripped out, this year’s National Defense Authorization Act had a provision expressing concern about the soft ground problem and requiring the Pentagon to report. With grassroots pressure, it could make it through next year.

Support for Okinawa in one place can stimulate solidarity elsewhere. Sizable demonstrations in Tokyo, for example, could get coverage both nationally and internationally, possibly drawing attention from the American left. That, in turn, could reinvigorate the movement in Okinawa. The Suga strategy aims to foster defeatism; only by turning such possibilities into realities can base opponents everywhere overcome it.

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