Browse By

Bold Steps Needed for Post-Covid Relations Between Japan and the Russian Far East

SNA (Tokyo) — A promising trend in relations between Japan and the Russian Far East has been put on ice by the coronavirus pandemic. As soon as the health emergency is under control, Tokyo should be bold in resuming ties with the region that is Japan’s closest geographic neighbor.

The distance across La Pérouse Strait, which separates Hokkaido and Sakhalin, is only 44 kilometers, yet it has often seemed an unbridgeable gulf. This was a Cold War frontier, patrolled by Soviet and Japanese submarines. Even after the end of that conflict, ties remained frosty, with few Japanese tourists or investors (except for energy companies) venturing into Sakhalin or other regions of the Russian Far East. Recently, however, more positive signs have begun to emerge.

In May 2016, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe heralded a “new approach” to relations with Russia. This has underperformed in its main aim of resolving the countries’ territorial dispute over the Russian-held Southern Kuril Islands, which Japan claims as its Northern Territories. Yet, the policy has had beneficial implications for ties across Japan’s northern border.

Abe himself has led the way. In September 2016, he made his first visit to the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok where he announced his “dream” that “the sparkle of Vladivostok will light up even the farthest reaches of the Pacific Ocean.” The reality has yet to live up to the imagination of Abe’s speechwriters, yet Japan’s involvement in the Russian Far East has steadily grown.

Abe has returned to Vladivostok every September since 2016 and increased numbers of Japanese have followed in his footsteps. More than 20,000 Japanese tourists visited the city in 2018, an increase of 15% from a year earlier. This was assisted by Russia’s introduction of an e-visa system in 2017, which permits Japanese citizens to make short visits to Vladivostok without receiving a visa in advance.

In 2020, this trend was set to accelerate with the launch of new flight connections. In February and March, JAL and ANA each launched new services between Narita and Vladivostok. 2020-21 was also designated the Year of Japan-Russia Inter-Regional and Sister-City Exchange, with the opening ceremony scheduled for Sapporo in May. It seemed the countries were well on their way to reaching their goal of 400,000 total annual visits by 2023.

Yet, as in so many areas, Covid-19 has brought progress to a shuddering halt. On the same day that ANA’s new Vladivostok route was launched, Russia announced the closure of its borders. The only flights now operating are those to repatriate citizens. The start of the Year of Inter-Regional Exchange was postponed, and a new casino near Vladivostok, which had hoped to welcome Japanese and other tourists in July, will now open to little fanfare.

There are many legitimate criticisms of Abe’s Russia policy. The Japanese prime minister has turned a blind eye to Russian aggression overseas and has been naive to think that he can achieve a territorial deal by ingratiating himself with President Vladimir Putin. All the same, closer ties between Japan and the Russian Far East should be wholeheartedly welcomed.

The 6 million residents of the Russian Far East live on a double periphery, isolated from both East Asia and the rest of Russia. Although conditions have improved in recent years, the region still lacks infrastructure, economic opportunities, and integration with neighbors. Covid-19 is set to undermine the Russian Far East’s recent progress, and its impact could be especially severe on energy-exporting Sakhalin, where the effects of the pandemic are compounded by a collapse in global energy prices.

Japan has a stake in the success of the Russian Far East. If the region prospers, Japan will have a stable and dynamic economic partner on its northern frontier. If, however, the Russian Far East were to badly falter, it could become an exporter of crime and pollution, as was the case during the 1990s.

A further consideration is that, without engagement from other countries, the Russian Far East will become increasingly reliant on ties with China. This will strengthen the partnership between Moscow and Beijing, whose growing closeness is already viewed with suspicion by both Japan and the United States.

Regaining the momentum lost in 2020 will not be easy. Hokkaido, which is the Japanese prefecture with closest links to Russia, has been one of the areas of Japan worst affected by Covid-19. Russia also has the second-highest number of confirmed infections in the world, including cases in all nine regions of the Russian Far East.

A particular concern for Tokyo is the fate of visa-free visits to the disputed islands. These operate each summer, and permit Japanese former residents, who were expelled after the Pacific War, to visit ancestral graves. These boat trips from Hokkaido, which usually begin in May, have been postponed and, following the discovery of the first Covid-19 case on the islands on May 17, they will not be restarted soon. Indeed, there is a worry that, with the average age of the former islanders over 85 and with Russia regarding the program as outdated, the visa-free trips may never resume.

What then to do? In the post-pandemic environment, Tokyo could revert to small-scale measures that will deliver gradual improvements in Japan’s relations with the Russian Far East. Yet, if Japan really wants to see transformative change, it needs to be bolder.

Specifically, Japan should embrace the idea of a broader visa-waiver system between Hokkaido and Sakhalin. This would permit residents of each region to make unlimited, short trips across the border without the need for a visa. Comparable “local border traffic agreements” exist between Russia and both Norway and Latvia, where they have proved unproblematic.

This concept has often been raised by the Russian side, yet Japan has been hesitant. By adopting it now, Tokyo would give a major post-pandemic boost to relations with the Russian Far East. In addition, by assisting in the emergence of a single economic zone between Hokkaido and Sakhalin, this scheme would open up additional opportunities in the areas of tourism and energy. It could even give impetus to the idea of one day building a bridge or tunnel to connect Hokkaido and Sakhalin.

Another advantage is that the visa-waiver system would apply to the disputed islands, which are administered as part of Sakhalin. The failure of Abe’s efforts to secure any territorial deal demonstrates that Russia has no intention of transferring any of the four islands. Moreover, if the current system of visa-free trips for former residents is ended, Japan will lose all connection with this territory.

A visa-waiver system would eliminate this concern by permitting any resident of Hokkaido, and not only former islanders, to visit the disputed territory. This increase in access can also be achieved without officially abandoning Japan’s claims to sovereignty.

The Covid-19 pandemic is a tragedy for all countries, yet it is also an opportunity for fresh thinking. After the crisis has passed, instead of returning to business as usual, Tokyo should move relations with the Russian Far East to a new level, thereby transforming Japan’s northern frontier from a closed barrier into a gateway to Eurasia.

For breaking news, follow on Twitter @ShingetsuNews